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Abstract
We study the effect of inflowing remittances – a major source of capital for many
countries – on tax-revenues and tax-policy. Instrumenting remittances with changes
in the oil-price interacted with a country’s distance to oil-producing countries, we
find that remittances have a large positive effect on VAT revenues but no effect on
income-tax revenues. This suggests that remittances often escape the income tax
but can be taxed via consumption. We further show that tax policy is responsive
to shocks in incoming remittances: remittances make the adoption of VAT-systems
more likely, and they lead to lower VAT-rates and higher income-tax rates.
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1 Introduction
International migration is a strongly increasing global trend. According to the United
Nations, the number of migrants increased from 175 million people in 2000 up to 232
million in 2013. This trend is accompanied by a steady increase of money transfers from
these migrants to their home countries, so called remittances. Figure 1 depicts that
remittances are of vital economic importance for low and middle income countries and
continuously gained importance over the last three decades. In 2013, total remittances
flows into low and middle income countries stood at 345 billion USD, which is more
than twice the amount of official development aid (ODA) and approximately half the
inflow of foreign direct investments (FDI). These large monetary inflows affect micro-
and macroeconomic outcomes in the receiving countries. For example, the literature has
demonstrated that remittances affect the quality of governance (Ahmed 2012; Ahmed
2013; Berdiev et al. 2013), financial sector development (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009;
Aggarwal et al. 2011), exchange rate regimes (Singer 2010), international competitiveness
(Lo´pez et al. 2008; Acosta et al. 2009) and schooling decisions (Edwards and Ureta 2003;
Alcaraz et al. 2012; Ambler et al. 2015).1
Despite their enormous importance, little research exists on the relevance and im-
pact of inflowing remittances for public finances of receiving countries. In this paper,
we aim to fill this gap. We study how remittances affect tax revenues and tax policy in
receiving countries. In particular, we address two interrelated research questions. First,
we estimate the effect of remittances on the level and structure of tax revenues. Figure
2 is indicative that there is a link between inflowing remittances and tax revenue; remit-
tances are positively correlated with the share of VAT/sales-tax revenue and negatively
correlated with the share of income-tax revenue. Second, to examine whether such chang-
ing patterns of tax revenue also affect tax policy, we investigate how value added (VAT)
and/or personal income (PIT) tax rates respond to shocks in the inflow of remittances.
We also study if remittances affect the likelihood of VAT adoption and if the progressivity
1The net effect of remittances on aggregate output is not clearly established empirically. The economic
relevance of remittances and the relevant literature are surveyed in Yang (2011). A more detailed
literature review is in section 2.
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Figure 1: Remittances flows into low and middle income countries
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Notes: Remittances inflows to low and middle income countries (according to World Bank definition)
compared to FDI inflows as well as official development assistance and official aid. All variables measured
in billions of current USD. Source: World Bank.
of the income tax is responsive to variation in inflowing remittances.
Remittances are of particular economic importance for non-developed countries. At
the same time, it is well known that a functioning tax system and solid public finances are
crucial for the development of countries (Keen 2013; Besley and Persson 2014). Studying
the link between public finances and remittances is therefore particularly relevant for
non-developed countries and a better understanding of economic development of poorer
countries. If remittances foster the power to tax, an attribute at the heart of state
development (Besley and Persson 2014), they may help to improve the provision of public
goods as well as the tax system. Therefore, one potential implication for development
policy might be that sending remittances to the home country should be facilitated and
even incentivized. Our research questions are also relevant for the importance of choosing
an optimal tax mix and structure. The design of the tax structure can have a positive
effect on economic growth even in absence of changes in tax revenues (Arnold et al. 2011;
Gordon and Li 2009), and our results shed light on the effects of remittances on the choice
of tax structure.
Remittances depend on many factors that also matter for tax revenues and tax
2
Figure 2: Remittances vs. VAT/sales and income taxes in 2000-13
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(b) Income, profit and capital gains taxes
Notes: Data on remittances comes from the World Bank. The source of tax-revenue data is International
Center for Tax and Development. Both variables are averaged over the period 2000-13. The sample
includes all countries with average inflow of remittances higher than 2% of GDP.
policy. We address this endogeneity and isolate the causal effect of remittances. Our
identification strategy exploits the fact that a large share of remittances to developing
countries is sent from migrants working abroad in oil-producing countries. According
to data from 2013, the top 20 oil producing countries generated about 47% of total
outgoing remittances.2 We instrument remittances with changes in the world-wide price
of oil interacted with a country’s (weighted) distance to its three nearest oil-producing
countries. The rationale behind this instrument is that (i) the oil-price affects wages and
employment and, hence, remittances of migrants working in oil-producing countries, and
(ii) that remittances are more likely to be affected by the price of oil the closer a receiving
country is to an oil-producing country. Figure 3 provides visual evidence of the first-stage
correlation; the annual evolution of average incoming remittances indeed closely follows
the development of the oil price and received remittances are inversely related to the
distance to oil-producing counties. The identifying assumption in our empirical approach
is that the oil price has no differential effect on public finances – our dependent variable –
on countries that are closer or further away from oil producers; except for the differential
2Data on estimated flows of bilateral remittances shows that the geographical distribution of countries
receiving remittances from these top 20 oil producers is quite dispersed. In 2013 well over one hundred
countries have received at least one hundred million USD in remittances from these countries.
3
effect through remittances. This instrument generates plausibly exogenous variation in
remittances over time and across countries, and overcomes problems of endogeneity.3
Figure 3: Evidence for first stage correlation
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(b) Remittances and distance to oil producers
Notes: Price of oil per barrel in 2013 USD compared to unweighted average of incoming remittances as
a share in GDP. The sample includes all countries for which data on remittances is available from the
World Bank.
Our empirical findings show that remittances have a large and persistent effect on
revenues generated from VAT and sales taxes. A 10%-point increase in the share of remit-
tances in GDP increases the share of VAT/sales-tax revenue in GDP by approximately
3%-points. We do not find a significant effect of remittances on income-tax revenues.
The effect on total tax revenues is not significant either. Our findings hence suggest that
remittances tend to escape the income tax but can be taxed via consumption. We then
go on and examine how governments’ tax policy responds to shocks in remittances. The
empirical results demonstrate that higher inflows of remittances increase the likelihood
of introducing a VAT system. We further find that remittances lead to lower VAT rates,
whereas personal-income-tax rates are increased in response to increased remittances. In
particular, an increase in remittances/GDP by 10%-points approximately increases the
personal-income-tax rate by 13%-points and decreases the standard VAT rate by 6%-
points. Our results also show that the level of progressivity of the income-tax system is
3This identification strategy is similar to the one used in Ahmed (2013) who explores the effect of
remittances on quality of governance. We exclude oil producers from our analysis because their public
finances are obviously directly affected by shocks in oil prices. Acemoglu et al. (2013) use the global oil
price interacted with local oil reserves as a source of variation to instrument for local-area income.
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increased through increasing remittances.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the possible
mechanisms behind the effect of remittances on tax revenues and tax rates, and discusses
the related literature. Section 3 explains our empirical strategy. In section 4 we present
the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Mechanisms and contribution to the literature
In this section, we first discuss possible mechanisms behind the effects of remittances on
tax revenues and tax policy; it therefore provides conceptual guidance to our empirical
analysis. The second subsection then presents a detailed literature review with a focus
on the most closely related papers.
2.1 Conceptual discussion of mechanisms
Remittances and tax revenues. We expect remittances to have differential effects on
income-tax revenue and indirect-tax revenue. It is difficult for governments to enforce the
taxation of remittances through income taxes because remittances are hardly reported for
income-tax purposes and governments are not able to track received remittances. As a
consequence, only few countries tax remittances directly through the income tax.4 This
would suggest that the impact of inflowing remittances on income-tax revenue in the
receiving country is small (positive) or zero.
However, remittances might have indirect effects on income-tax revenues. For ex-
ample, inflowing remittances may facilitate entrepreneurial activities (Yang 2008) and
in turn lead to higher (taxable) income-tax revenues (Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). In
contrast to this positive effect, “Dutch disease” problems may imply that remittances
have a negative effect on revenues from direct taxes. Inflowing remittances, just as any
4Remittances are often transmitted in cash (through mailed envelopes) or via untraceable bank trans-
fers. Freund and Spatafora (2005) estimate informal remittances to amount to approximately 35-75% of
official flows. A 2005 Worldbank survey demonstrates that only 5 out of 40 developing and transition
countries imposed a tax on remittances. While Columbia and Peru did so via a financial transaction
tax, Ecuador taxed remittances via the VAT. Poland and Georgia taxed remittances via the income tax
(de Luna Martinez 2005).
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other inflow of capital, may cause appreciations of the real exchange rate, and therefore
a loss of external competitiveness (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2004; Lo´pez et al. 2008).
This loss of competitiveness, potentially accompanied by negative labor-supply responses
(e.g., Jadotte and Ramos 2015), can reduce direct-tax revenues. In light of these dif-
ferent channels, the theoretical total net effect of remittances on direct-tax revenues is
ambiguous.
Remittances are likely to be used for consumption purposes; while some received
remittances might also be saved, improving living conditions of family and friends at home
through providing them with higher consumption possibilities is often the aim of senders
of remittances (Abdih et al. 2012). If remittances are channeled into consumption, they
should have a positive effect on revenues from indirect taxes.
These theoretical considerations for the effect of inflowing remittances on tax rev-
enues from indirect and direct taxes make us expect that remittances have a larger effect
on indirect-tax revenues than on income-tax revenues. Section 4.1 presents the empirical
findings with regard to the effect of remittances on tax revenues.
Remittances and tax-policy response. Remittances may trigger a policy response
in the form of altered tax rates. This policy response could work through different
channels. First, governments may wish to tax migration or remittances directly. Although
direct taxation of migration is a longstanding proposal (Bhagwati 1972), administrative
obstacles make it very difficult to be implemented in practice; remittances are usually
not reported for tax purposes and are therefore difficult to be taxed directly via the
income tax. However, because remittances are to a great extent channeled into private
consumption, it might be desirable for governments to tax remittances indirectly through
consumption taxes. As a result, positive shocks in remittances – which make the existence
of remittances more salient to policy makers – may motivate governments to introduce
VAT systems or increase existing indirect-tax rates in order to capture more of the pie of
remittances.
Second, a possible remittance-induced positive effect on tax revenues may motivate
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policy makers to use this improved scope of public finances and reduce tax rates; for
example to stimulate the economy. This channel suggests a negative effect of remittances
on tax rates. Third, huge inflows of remittances may have “Dutch disease” effects and
reduce labor supply, and therefore cause a tax-policy response. In order to restore com-
petitiveness and increase labor supply, governments may want to reduce direct (labor)
taxes, such as income, profit or payroll taxes. To keep the direct-tax-rate reduction rev-
enue neutral, this could be accompanied by an increase of indirect taxes (VAT or sales
taxes).
Fourth, the effect of inflowing remittances on tax rates has to be considered in the
light of large informal sectors in developing countries (see e.g., Schneider et al. 2010).5
On the one hand, higher inflowing remittances may have a positive effect on indirect-
tax revenues. This in turn allows governments to reduce indirect-tax rates in order to
reduce the incentives to work in the informal economy. On the other hand, Aggarwal
et al. (2011) show that higher inflowing remittances improve financial development, partly
because bank accounts are required to receive remittances. This increased presence of
bank accounts facilitates the enforcement of income taxes; something which is often very
difficult in the cash-based economies of developing countries. Facilitation of income-
tax enforcement may allow governments to install a more balanced mixture of indirect
and direct tax rates – which is difficult when income taxes cannot be enforced. As a
result, more inflowing remittances could increase income-tax rates. To sum up, efforts
to reduce the shadow economy and improve the possibilities of enforcing the income tax
might imply that inflowing remittances have a negative effect on indirect-tax rates and a
positive effect on direct-tax rates.
Finally, if receivers of remittances are clustered in certain parts of the income dis-
tribution, governments might want to change the redistributive nature of the tax system.
For example, if middle-class families have better possibilities to send out workers to other
countries than low-class families, governments could correct for this by increasing the
5As discussed in Gordon and Li (2009), large informal sectors are a considerable problem and poten-
tially have a strong effect on the choice of the tax structure in developing countries. This, for example,
implies that the VAT, which is usually regarded as efficient, may not be the preferred tax instrument in
developing countries (Emran and Stiglitz 2005).
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progressivity of the income tax.
The mechanisms described above show that it is eventually an empirical question
of whether and how remittances affect tax policy. Our empirical findings in this regard
are presented in section 4.2.
2.2 Relevant literature
A large body of literature studies both the micro- and macroeconomic consequences of
remittances. Microeconomic research demonstrates that remittances reduce poverty (e.g.
Adams and Page 2005), improve education (e.g. Alcaraz et al. 2012; Ambler et al. 2015),
and foster financial development (e.g. Aggarwal et al. 2011). Evidence concerning the
macroeconomic effects of remittances is inconclusive. While remittances have been con-
sidered as a facilitation of external financing constraints and thus a source of investment
for developing countries, they might also trigger Dutch disease phenomenons such as real
exchange rate appreciation and, eventually, a weakening of international competitiveness
(Lo´pez et al. 2008; Acosta et al. 2009). The evidence on the effect of remittances on
output growth is also mixed, with some studies showing a positive influence on growth
(Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009) while others do not find such effects (Yang 2011). Singer
(2010) finds that inflowing remittances affect exchange-rate regimes, and hence provides
evidence that policy in receiving countries is responsive to incoming remittances. More-
over, recent research demonstrates that remittances also have detrimental effects on the
institutional quality of receiving countries (Abdih et al. 2012), as they can weaken gover-
nance by increasing levels of corruption (Ahmed 2012; Ahmed 2013; Berdiev et al. 2013)
and crowd out public spending on education and health (Ebeke 2012).
Despite this active literature on remittances, to the best of our knowledge there are
only a few studies which study the fiscal implications of remittances. Ebeke (2014) studies
whether remittances increase the level and the stability of tax revenue ratios (tax revenue
divided by country GDP), and whether these effects depend on the presence of a VAT
system. The empirical results indicate that inflowing remittances lead to higher and less
volatile tax revenue ratios when VAT systems are present. We aim to complement this
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paper by exploring the effect of remittances on the tax mix, i.e. on tax revenue generated
through direct and indirect taxes, as well as their effect on VAT and PIT rates. In
addition, while Ebeke estimates conditional correlation that make a causal interpretation
difficult, we use an identification strategy that yields arguably more reliable results.
Abdih et al. (2012) consider the fiscal implications of remittances and study the
impact of remittances on government revenue for 17 remittance-dependent countries in
the Middle East, North Africa, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The paper estimates
a positive effect of inflowing remittances on different types of tax revenues. In some of
their specifications, Abdih et al. (2012) instrument remittances with the level of income
in the sending country. However, given that income in sending countries might impact
tax revenues in receiving countries not only via remittances, it remains unclear if their
results can be attributed a causal meaning. As opposed to our study, Abdih et al. (2012)
do not examine the effect of remittances on tax policy and tax rates.
Singer (2012) explores, among other issues, how remittances affect government
spending and total tax revenues. His regressions show a positive association between
remittances and government expenditures, and his further analyses reveal that this result
can partly be explained by a positive effect of remittances on total tax revenues. The
latter finding is derived in regressions where remittances are instrumented by the per
capita GDP of the ten top remittance-sending countries of the world weighted with the
inverse of the distance of each country to the remittance-receiving countries in his sample.
In contrast to our paper, Singer (2012) neither studies the effects on different types of
tax revenues nor the effects on tax policy.
3 Empirical strategy
Regression equation of interest. We aim to estimate the causal effect of remittances
flowing into a country on the country’s structure of tax revenue and on the PIT and VAT
rates. The regression equation of interest is given by:
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Yi,t = βRi,t + αXi,t + λi + φt + µi,t, (1)
where Ri,t is remittances (as a share of GDP) flowing into country i in year t. Yi,t
is either one of the following dependent variables: (i) total tax revenue (as a share of
GDP), (ii) tax revenue generated from VAT and sales taxes (as a share of GDP), (iii) tax
revenue generated from income, profit and capital gains taxes (as a share of GDP), (iv) a
dummy variable indicating whether a country i has a VAT system in year t, (v) standard
VAT rate, (vi) marginal and average PIT rate, and (vii) a measure for the PIT system’s
progressivity. Xi,t is a set of control variables to control for economic (logged GDP, GDP
growth, logged exchange rate) and demographic (logged population, population growth
and share of working age population) conditions. As in e.g. Ahmed (2013), we include a
set of country fixed effects, λi, and a linear year trend, φt. µi,t is a standard error term.
Our coefficient of interest is β, the effect of remittances on the respective dependent
variable Y .
Endogeneity. Estimating equation 1 using OLS would likely yield biased results for the
effect of remittances. For example, the decision to migrate and send home remittances is
often driven by the economic conditions and earnings possibilities in the home country. At
the same time, economic conditions and earnings possibilities are likely to have an effect
on tax revenue and tax rates, our dependent variables. It is unclear if the country fixed
effects and control variables can fully account for these sources of endogeneity. Issues
of reverse causality may also play a role if workers decide to migrate because they find
the tax system in their country inappropriate (e.g., too high taxes) or unfair. Another
source of bias is non-random measurement error; it may be that poorer countries with
less tracking capacities are more likely to mis-measure inflows of remittances (Ahmed
2013). Although we collect the most common and most reliable of all existing data (the
data are described in detail below) and use country fixed effects, which should partly
absorb this bias, it remains unclear if all sources of bias due to measurement error can
be eliminated.
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Instrument and first stage. Our empirical strategy to mitigate these problems of
endogeneity is to exploit sources of variation in remittances that are not related to the
error term µi,t in equation 1. Motivated by the strategy of Ahmed (2013) and Acemoglu
et al. (2013), we instrument for remittances with the interaction of the world-wide price
of oil and the weighted distance of a country to the three nearest oil-producing countries.6
This instrument generates variation over time – via the oil price – and across countries –
via the distance to oil producing countries. Our first stage regression reads:
Ri,t = δ(pt−1 × di) + α′Xi,t + λ′i + φ
′
t + i,t, (2)
where pt−1 is the global oil price in year t− 1 (varies over time but not across countries),
and di is population-weighted distance from country i to the three nearest oil-producing
countries (varies across countries and not over time). All other variables are as defined in
the second-stage equation 1. We use the lag of oil price to account for lagged translation
of the oil price to remittances.
The motivation for our instrument is twofold: First, it is observed that many mi-
grants work in oil-exporting countries, and their wages are affected by the global price
of oil. Since remittances are likely to be a function of the migrant’s wage, we expect the
oil price to affect remittances. Figure 3, as well as the supportive evidence documented
in Ahmed (2013), shows that remittances received by poor countries closely track the
price of oil. Second, remittances to countries close to oil producers are more likely to be
affected by oil-price changes than remittances to countries that are further away from oil
producers. Migrants are likely to emigrate to countries close to their home country, and
if the neighboring countries happen to be oil producers received remittances are more af-
fected by the oil price. This line of argument is supported by figures in Ahmed (2013) as
well as Figure 3, which shows that countries receive more remittances if they are located
closely to oil producers.7 To summarize, our instrument exploits the differential impact
6We only study the effect of inflowing remittances in countries that are non-oil producers. The top-
20 oil-producing countries are as follows: Algeria, Brazil, Canada, China, Indonesia, Islamic Republic
of Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Venezuela.
7Singer (2012) is a further example stating that migrants are more likely to settle in countries closer
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of oil prices between countries in which the oil price is a stronger or weaker determinant
of inflowing remittances.
The main coefficients of the first-stage regressions are displayed in tables 1 and 2.
The estimates for the effect of our instrument, oil-price times distance, on remittances
are statistically significant and have the expected sign; an increase in the instrument has
a positive effect on inflowing remittances. We can therefore confirm the rationale behind
using this instrument. The tables also shows that the F-statistics of excluded instruments
are mostly around 7, and therefore sometimes smaller than the benchmark value of 10.
However, as discussed in Angrist and Pischke (2008, page 209) and Angrist and Pischke
(2009), weak instruments are not a problem in just-identified models: as long as the first-
stage coefficient is not zero, a weak instrument does not bias the coefficient of interest
in the just-identified case. Any problems with too weak instruments in just-identified
models are mirrored in the standard errors of the second-stage but they do not cause the
second stage to be biased.
Identifying assumption. The identifying assumption of our empirical strategy is that
the instrument – oil price interacted with distance to oil producers – affects our dependent
tax-system variables only through remittances. In general, we acknowledge that the oil
price is likely to have a direct effect on public finances and tax rates in remittance-
receiving countries. However, we argue that it is unlikely that public finances of countries
closer or further away from oil producers are differently affected by oil-price shocks. For
example, some countries subsidize oil and an increasing oil price might therefore force
these countries to increase taxes. Now consider two comparable countries: both subsidize
oil in the same way, and one of them is located closely to oil-producing countries and the
other one is further away. Our identifying assumption would be violated if an increasing
oil price creates different budgetary pressure on these two countries. Since both these
countries face the same global oil price and subsidize oil in the same way, we find it
implausible that our identifying assumption is violated and that the budgetary effects of
to their home country.
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the oil price on these two countries will be different. However, since the country closer to
the oil producer is likely to receive more remittances from oil producing countries because
more workers migrated from the closer country to oil producers than from the country
farther away, it is likely that the increasing oil price has a larger effect on remittances
sent to the country located more closely.
We take several additional steps to further back the validity of our instrument and
support the identifying assumption: First, we exclude all countries from our empirical
analysis which are oil producers because their tax systems are very likely to be directly
affected by changes in the oil price. Second, we follow Ahmed (2013, page 1170) and
argue that “because the world price of oil is largely determined by supply decisions in oil
producers and demand conditions in large (industrialized and rich) economies, it provides
a plausibly exogenous source of variation in remittance flows that is unrelated to the
economic, political, and social conditions in remittance-receiving countries.” Third, we
condition on economic conditions and population size. It appears unlikely that, absent
any oil prices, our dependent tax-system variables would have developed differently across
countries with similar economic conditions and population sizes that are further away or
closer to oil producers.
Fourth, we eliminate any time-constant factors that affect both the IV and the
dependent variables by including a full set of country fixed effects. That is, we only exploit
within-country variation over time and eliminate all potentially confounding factors that
are constant over time. For example, countries closer to an oil producer may be more
likely to have a trade agreement with oil-producing countries than countries further away.
The country fixed effects account for this unless the oil price affects the implementation
of new trade agreements differently for countries further or closer away from oil producers
during our sample period. However, as trade agreements are subject to long negotiations
and they should not be affected by short-run variation in oil prices.
Data and summary statistics. The data on remittances comes from the World Bank
and is generally computed by using data on personal transfers and compensation of em-
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ployees from balance of payments statistics. The latter is the income earned by workers
in economies where they are not resident (or from nonresident employers) and transfers is
from residents of one economy to residents of another. Although some cross-country het-
erogeneity may exist in the quality of data, the general expectation is that these figures
are likely to underestimate the true amount of remittances because a good share of these
payments are done through informal channels (Freund and Spatafora 2005; Freund and
Spatafora 2008). The data on total tax revenue and its structure comes from the Interna-
tional Center for Tax and Development. This is based on harmonized data collected from
different sources, including IMF Government Finance Statistics, IMF country reports,
OECD tax statistics, African economic outlook, CEPALSTAT, etc., and seems to be the
largest available cross-country data on tax revenues. The source of VAT and PIT rates is
the World Tax Indicators dataset made available by the Andrew Young School of Policy
Studies (Peter et al. 2010). After merging together these different datasets we get an
unbalanced panel data of up to 129 countries for a maximum period starting from 1970
to 2013. Table A1 of the appendix presents the summary statistics and sources of the
variables used in the paper.
4 Results
4.1 The effect of remittances on tax revenue
Conditional correlations. As a first step, we directly regress remittances on the re-
ceiving country’s tax revenue controlling for several economic and demographic covariates
and including country and year fixed effects as specified in Equation 1. The estimation
results are collected in Table A2 of the appendix. Columns 3-4 of Table A2 demonstrate
a positive correlation between the inflow of remittances-to-GDP and share of VAT and
sales tax revenue in GDP. Symmetrically, columns 5-6 show that remittances are nega-
tively correlated with the share of revenue from income taxes. We find no evidence of a
14
statistically significant net effect on total tax revenue (columns 1-2).8
These results are consistent with our theoretical predictions, however, as described
above, these OLS results may be biased due to different sources of endogeneity. Therefore
the remainder of this sub-section is devoted to more credibly identifying the causal effects
of remittances.
Instrumental variable approach. Table 1 collects the main results from a 2SLS
estimation. The first stage is presented in the lower panel of Table 1 which shows that
the main instrument – which is constructed from the multiplication of the price of a barrel
of crude oil and population-weighted distance to the closest three oil producing countries
– is a strong predictor of remittances.
The second-stage estimates presented in the upper panel of Table 1 demonstrate a
statistically significant effect of remittances on VAT and sales-tax revenue (columns 3-4).
The effect is also economically large with a 10 percentage point increase of remittance to
GDP on average increasing VAT and sales tax revenue to GDP by 3 percentage points.
Neither the effect on total tax revenues (columns 1-2) nor on revenue generated from the
income tax (columns 5-6) are statistically significant.
4.2 The effect of remittances on tax policy
This section reports the results for the effect of remittances on tax policy, i.e., the intro-
duction of VAT system as well as VAT and PIT rates and progressivity. As discussed in
Section 2: remittance-dependent countries may directly try to tax remittances, they may
indirectly internalize this factor into their decisions related to tax policy and tax admin-
istration, or tax policy may respond to the remittance-induced changes in the respective
tax bases.
8Note that due to the varying data-availability of the dependent variable, the sample sizes of Table
A2 vary. We have estimated the regressions of Tables A2 and 1 fixing the sample on the smallest one of
column 3, and found robust results.
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Table 1: 2SLS estimations: Remittances and the structure of tax revenue in GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Total tax revenue VAT and sales tax Income, profit & capital tax
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1
Remittances / GDP 0.350 0.325 0.335** 0.295** 0.202 0.161
(0.320) (0.283) (0.156) (0.147) (0.200) (0.179)
Ln population -1.739 -2.461 0.759 0.726 7.259** 6.594**
(4.670) (4.354) (3.571) (3.064) (3.571) (3.237)
Population growth -0.406 -0.727 -0.007 -0.153 -0.541 -0.611
(0.638) (0.631) (0.222) (0.223) (0.439) (0.435)
Working age population 0.196 0.186 -0.269* -0.240 0.124 0.157
(0.212) (0.207) (0.161) (0.146) (0.123) (0.111)
Ln exchange rate 0.198 0.223 0.319*** 0.291*** -0.472** -0.416**
(0.403) (0.369) (0.093) (0.081) (0.203) (0.185)
Ln GDP -1.775 -2.114 1.578 1.203 0.167 -0.167
(1.928) (1.926) (1.498) (1.304) (1.290) (1.208)
GDP growth -0.007 0.005 -0.007 -0.014 -0.013 0.025
(0.029) (0.031) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017)
Inflation -0.000** -0.000* -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F 8.110 5.476 14.46 15.78 8.863 10.05
First-stage Remittances / GDP
Oil price x distance (t-1) 1.025*** 1.061*** 1.016** 1.170** 1.112** 1.201***
(0.374) (0.379) (0.428) (0.486) (0.436) (0.461)
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,440 1,417 914 904 1,115 1,095
R-squared 0.107 0.107 0.161 0.154 0.092 0.084
Countries 84 84 64 64 72 72
F excl. instrument 7.38 7.72 5.5 5.64 6.37 6.66
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: 2SLS regression results based on empirical strategy described in section 3. The dependent variables are (all as
shares of GDP): Total tax revenues (1)-(2), Tax revenue from VAT and sales taxes (3)-(4), Tax revenue from income, profit
and capital taxes (5)-(6). The explanatory variable of interest is inflowing remittances as a share of GDP. This explanatory
variable of interest is instrumented with Oil price x distance, which indicates the population-weighted distance to the closest
three oil producing countries times the international price of oil. All regressions include country fixed effects (FE) and a
linear time trend (not reported). First-stage regressions include all control variables of the second-stage (not reported).
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries. Data sources described in
section 3.
Conditional correlations. We, again, begin the analysis with simple OLS estimations
where we regress tax-policy parameters on remittances controlling for several variables
and country and year fixed effects. The results are collected in Table A3 of the appendix,
where the dependent variable is a dummy for the introduction of a VAT system (columns
1-2), standard VAT rate (3-4), the average (5, 7) and marginal (6, 8) PIT rates, or the
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level of progressivity of the income-tax system (9-10). This exercise shows that the inflow
of remittances are correlated with an increased likelihood of introducing a VAT, but does
not yield robust evidence on the relation between remittances and receiving country’s tax
rates.
Instrumental variable approach. In Table 2 we use our main 2SLS specification to
test the causal effect of remittances on tax-policy parameters. As before, we see a very
robust positive effect of the oil×distance instrument on remittances in the first-stage. In
the second stage, we first find evidence that a positive shock in remittances increases the
likelihood of having a VAT system (columns 1 and 2). We further observe a negative effect
of remittances on (existing) standard VAT rates in column 4 where we control for the
share of VAT and sales tax revenue. Given the positive relation between VAT revenue and
remittances that we saw before, it seems that the VAT rate is played down (up) when
governments realize that revenues from this source are increasing (decreasing). Such
additional “windfall” revenues may give a leeway to the government to try, for example,
and stimulate the economy by relaxing the tax burden.
The remainder of Table 2 is devoted to PIT rates, which in columns 5 and 7 (6 and
8) is defined as the average (marginal) tax rate for income equivalent to a country’s per
capita GDP adjusted for the main allowances, deductions, credits, and other main rules
of the tax code. In these estimates we consistently find a positive response of income tax
rates to increased remittances. Governments also significantly increase the overall level
of progressivity of the income-tax system; these results are reported in columns 9-10.
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Table 2: 2SLS estimations: Remittances and tax policy response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES VAT VAT rate PIT rate PIT rate Rate progression
introduction standard average marginal average marginal average marginal
Remittances / GDP 0.291** 0.319** -0.349 -0.605* 1.134** 1.526* 2.226 3.026* 0.003* 0.005**
(0.148) (0.155) (0.263) (0.357) (0.552) (0.791) (1.421) (1.641) (0.002) (0.003)
VAT and sales tax -0.063 0.940***
(0.088) (0.312)
Income, profit & capital tax 0.206 0.365
(0.271) (0.444)
Ln population -1.679 -1.518 3.304 0.749 16.93*** 19.07*** 7.760 -9.954 0.032 0.031
(1.681) (2.059) (4.704) (5.091) (5.165) (7.218) (12.513) (16.729) (0.021) (0.035)
Population growth 0.101 0.111 -0.098 -0.275 -0.226 -0.914 -2.282** -3.916** -0.003* -0.001
(0.089) (0.098) (0.282) (0.337) (0.328) (0.579) (1.038) (1.628) (0.002) (0.002)
Working age population -0.115 -0.130 0.178 0.299 0.274 0.305 0.235 0.363 0.000 -0.000
(0.072) (0.091) (0.277) (0.318) (0.257) (0.382) (0.451) (0.587) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln exchange rate 0.041 0.061 0.327 0.148 -0.102 0.061 -0.162 0.469 0.000 0.000
(0.061) (0.065) (0.248) (0.222) (0.274) (0.344) (0.448) (0.530) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln GDP 1.278 1.378 -3.436* -3.597 6.396** 9.502** 7.734** 13.253** 0.007 0.007
(0.879) (0.999) (2.033) (2.448) (2.582) (4.183) (3.738) (5.652) (0.010) (0.019)
GDP growth -0.021** -0.023** 0.018 0.020 0.024 0.071 0.061 0.039 0.000 -0.000
(0.010) (0.011) (0.030) (0.040) (0.033) (0.058) (0.071) (0.107) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.000 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
F 1.300 2.057 48.85 18.72 1.874 2.003 2.976 4.293 3.752 1.692
First-stage Remittances / GDP
Oil price x distance (t-1) 0.620* 0.620* 1.031** 0.800** 1.051*** 1.051*** 0.762*** 0.762*** 1.051*** 1.051***
(0.317) (0.317) (0.442) (0.338) (0.228) (0.228) (0.252) (0.252) (0.228) (0.228)
Time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 867 867 836 836 1,653 1,653 744 744 1,653 1,653
R-squared 0.121 0.121 0.169 0.226 0.098 0.098 0.085 0.085 0.098 0.098
Countries 60 60 61 61 116 116 62 62 116 116
F excl. Instrument 3.73 4.26 5.29 5.45 20.88 20.88 8.86 8.86 20.88 20.88
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: 2SLS regression results based on empirical strategy described in section 3. The dependent variables are: (1)-(2): a
dummy indicating whether a country has a VAT system, (3)-(4): standard VAT rates, (5)-(8): PIT rates, and (9)-(10): a
measure for the degree of income-tax progressivity. The explanatory variable of interest is inflowing remittances as a share
of GDP. This explanatory variable of interest is instrumented with Oil price x distance, which indicates the population-
weighted distance to the closest three oil producing countries times the international price of oil. All regressions include
country fixed effects (FE) and a linear time trend (not reported). First-stage regressions include all control variables of the
second-stage (not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries.
Data sources described in section 3.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the effect of remittances on tax revenues and tax rates. Instru-
menting inflowing remittances with an interaction of the global oil price and a country’s
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distance to oil producers, we find that remittances increase value-added-tax and sales-tax
revenue, and have no significant effect on direct tax revenues. This result is consistent
with our prediction that remittances are difficult to tax through income taxation, but can
be captured through their effect on consumption. The estimated impact is also sizable
with, on average, around a three-to-one effect of remittances on VAT and sales tax rev-
enue. This may help to shed light on the issue of why low and middle income countries
are so dependent on indirect taxes, as opposed to high-income countries.
Regarding the effect of remittances on tax policy, we find that increasing remittances
are associated with decreasing VAT rates and increasing PIT rates, as well as a slight
increase in income-tax progressivity. We also find that inflowing remittances make the
adoption of VAT systems more likely. Considering the conceptual discussion in section
2.1, this finding lends support to the interpretation that policy makers in remittances-
receiving countries aim at taxing remittances through consumption taxes and use the
extra indirect tax revenues from remittances to reduce VAT rates in order to foster par-
ticipation in the formal economy. In addition, more remittances lead to a more improved
financial sector (Aggarwal et al. 2011), hence facilitate the enforcement of income taxes,
and give governments the opportunity to increase income-tax rates in order to achieve
a more balanced mix of income and indirect tax rates. Our results are therefore in line
with recent literature of Gordon and Li (2009), who show in a theoretical framework that
non-sufficient financial information is a crucial predictor for the prevailing tax structures
in developing countries and the low rates of direct taxes.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Dependent variable:
Remittances / GDP, % 4,883 3.88 7.86 0.00 106.48 WDI
Tax revenues:
Total tax revenue / GDP, % 2,299 20.49 9.03 0.43 58.73 ICTD
VAT and/or sales tax / GDP, % 1,406 6.63 2.99 0.00 26.93 ICTD
Income, profit and capital gains tax / GDP, % 1,896 9.35 5.93 0.06 31.16 ICTD
Tax rates:
VAT introduction dummy 7,276 0.39 0.49 0 1 WTI
Standard VAT rate, % 2,616 15.71 5.14 2.00 35.00 WTI
PIT rate, average 2,903 6.86 9.47 0.00 52.29 WTI
PIT rate, marginal 2,903 11.60 14.48 0.00 78.09 WTI
PIT rate progression, average 2,903 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.14 WTI
PIT rate progression, marginal 2,903 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.18 WTI
Controls:
Log population 11,427 14.79 2.38 8.36 21.03 WDI
Population growth, % 11,419 1.85 1.67 -10.96 19.60 WDI
Share of working age population, % 10,389 58.59 6.86 44.90 85.81 WDI
Log nominal exchange rate to USD 9,183 1.53 4.51 -30.14 10.13 WDI
Log GDP 8,218 23.23 2.39 16.59 30.30 WDI
GDP growth, % 8,259 3.96 6.93 -64.05 189.83 WDI
Inflation, % 8,243 36 447 -65 26,766 WDI
Instrument:
Log crude oil price per barrel x distance 11,228 11.25 1.03 6.32 14.01 SRWE
Data sources: WDI - World Bank World Development Indicators, ICTD - International Center for Tax and Development,
WTI - Andrew Young School World Tax Indicators, SRWE - British petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, WITS
- World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions, WPP - United Nations World Population Policies
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Table A2: OLS estimations: Remittances and the structure of tax revenue in GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Total tax revenue VAT and sales tax Income, profit & capital tax
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1
Remittances / GDP -0.062 -0.030 0.058** 0.058* -0.049*** -0.034**
(0.056) (0.041) (0.025) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016)
Ln population -0.707 -1.913 -0.335 -0.278 4.108 2.742
(3.731) (3.673) (2.280) (2.222) (3.621) (3.574)
Population growth -0.097 -0.349 0.115 -0.033 -0.158 -0.219
(0.460) (0.424) (0.132) (0.132) (0.352) (0.366)
Working age population 0.351** 0.307* 0.058 0.034 0.184 0.195*
(0.173) (0.178) (0.066) (0.067) (0.120) (0.118)
Ln exchange rate 0.102 0.117 0.254*** 0.213*** -0.411** -0.312**
(0.313) (0.275) (0.082) (0.069) (0.164) (0.156)
Ln GDP -2.657* -2.841* 0.031 0.025 0.809 0.483
(1.598) (1.661) (0.747) (0.747) (1.378) (1.346)
GDP growth 0.004 0.022 0.018 0.001 0.007 0.026*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
Inflation -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,670 1,640 1,073 1,056 1,349 1,321
R-squared 0.200 0.200 0.394 0.381 0.156 0.152
Countries 99 99 76 75 87 86
F 20.14 26680 1.925e+06 2238 1190 41.90
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: OLS regression results based on Equation 1. The dependent variables are (all as shares of GDP): Total tax revenues
(1)-(2), Tax revenue from VAT and sales taxes (3)-(4), Tax revenue from income, profit and capital taxes (5)-(6). The
explanatory variable of interest is inflowing remittances as a share of GDP. All regressions include country and year fixed
effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the level of countries.
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Table A3: OLS estimations: Remittances and tax policy response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES VAT VAT rate PIT rate PIT rate Rate progression
introduction standard average marginal average marginal average marginal
Remittances / GDP 0.018*** 0.017*** -0.006 -0.037 0.082 0.163* -0.217 -0.133 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.030) (0.054) (0.086) (0.154) (0.193) (0.000) (0.001)
VAT and sales tax 0.021** 0.382***
(0.010) (0.128)
Income, profit capital tax 0.199 0.341
(0.166) (0.293)
Ln population -2.526*** -2.524*** 3.803 3.498 19.57*** 24.38*** 15.88** 4.332 0.048*** 0.052*
(0.312) (0.313) (3.152) (2.911) (4.803) (6.742) (7.816) (10.309) (0.018) (0.030)
Population growth 0.047 0.045 -0.133 -0.213 -0.049 -0.547 -1.199*** -2.508*** -0.002 -0.001
(0.043) (0.042) (0.179) (0.194) (0.225) (0.448) (0.434) (0.786) (0.001) (0.002)
Working age population 0.014 0.013 0.018 -0.021 0.287 0.392 0.704** 1.111** 0.000 -0.001
(0.017) (0.017) (0.111) (0.116) (0.179) (0.262) (0.333) (0.486) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln exchange rate 0.028 0.023 0.349 0.279 0.058 0.057 -0.799* -0.634 -0.000 -0.000
(0.019) (0.018) (0.269) (0.264) (0.114) (0.202) (0.450) (0.669) (0.001) (0.001)
Ln GDP 0.407** 0.403** -2.220* -1.971 4.312*** 6.586** 5.945** 9.005* 0.005 0.005
(0.195) (0.190) (1.204) (1.241) (1.501) (2.681) (2.804) (4.619) (0.008) (0.015)
GDP growth -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 -0.024 0.080*** 0.149*** 0.092** 0.068 0.000*** 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.047) (0.043) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.002* 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,026 1,026 989 989 1,914 1,914 904 904 1,914 1,914
R-squared 0.538 0.542 0.392 0.424 0.277 0.218 0.423 0.404 0.150 0.067
Countries 72 72 73 73 129 129 72 72 129 129
F 1.98e+7 298597 1.78e+9 3.6e+7 4.692 3.768 9.788 12.57 4.100 1.832
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Notes: OLS regressions results based on Equation 1. The dependent variables are: (1)-(2): a dummy indicating whether
a country has a VAT system, (3)-(4): standard VAT rates, (5)-(8): PIT rates, and (9)-(10): a measure for the degree of
income-tax progressivity. The explanatory variable of interest is inflowing remittances as a share of GDP. All regressions
include country and year fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and are clustered at
the level of countries.
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